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largely by a cycle of eating and being eaten which
cannot and should not be interfered with because of a
passing squeamishness in a few humans. Are we, after
all, to intervene on behalf of a rodent to insure that its
rights are not violated by any condors?
This appeal to the necessity of predation in the
natural order of things is, of course, familiar rhetorical
territory for animal liberationists. They are quite used
to hearing about the hunter instinct from people who
do all of their hunting at Safeway (as though something
of great ecological import hinges upon the production
of cube steak and little styrofoam trays), Rhetoric
aside, the central misgivings of animal liberationists
were given voice several years ago by Tom Regan. 3
In the Hrst place, the holism of the deep ecologists
threatens us with a kind of "environmental fascism"
which would require the merciless extermination of
animals and, particularly, humans for the good of the
greater biotic whole. Secondly, it is utterly unclear how
anything below the conativc level of animals can be
sensibly argued to have any interests and, thus. any
good of its own. The attribution of sentience to plants
and rocks (let alone whole ecosystems) seems to be
something best left to the editors of the National
Enquirer, and if such things can't have beliefs, desires
and feelings, then how can they have any good apart
from that attributed to them by sentients? In other
words, there is an immediate problem with any claim
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Tbe clash between environmentalists and animal
liberationists was summarized a few years ago by the
title of Mark Sagoff's article "Animal Liberation and
Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce."]
The problem, of course, is not environmental ethics per
se but a certain kind of environmental ethics, namely,
what has come to he called "deep ecology" (as well as
"biocentrism," "ecocentrism" and "the land ethic"). !'or
the deep ecologist, environmental issues must be looked
at from a fully holistic perspective, that is, from the
point of view of the whole biosphere. At Hrst, this would
seem to be a natural extension of our basic moral
sentiments. Having established the moral considera
bility of all humans and then all mammals and then all
living individuals, the next logical step would seem to
be an extension of our moral concern to the biosphere
as a whole.
But, as was soon recognized, the holism of deep
ecology cuts directly against any strong concern for the
pain and suffering of individual animals; from the
biocentric point of view, the concern of animal
liberationists for the welfare of individual animals, is
"biologically preposterous," to use 1. Baird Callicott's
term. 2 The integrity of the biosphere is underpinned

Between the Species

PHILOSOPHY

16

Winter 1993

Animals, Arrogance and Unfathomably Deep Ecology

I was not doing with the tractor what was supposed to
be done with it, because this only implies that I would
not be doing wiili it what is usually done with tractors.
But I would be quite surprised if someone claimed that
I was not acting in the best interests Of the tractor. I
would understand someone saying that I was wasting a
piece ofmachinery that other humans might make better
use of, but what difference could any of this possibly
make in terms of what is good for the tractor?
However, in ilie case of trees, things are even worse.
Both Frey and Taylor argue that it is clearly not in the
interest of a tree to bul1doze it down, perhaps, for later
conversion into a coffee table; its interest is in
"flourishing." But here, an obvious pieee of question
begging is at work. What it means to flourish is, roughly,
La develop in the right way, and what is at stake here is
the issue of whether or not it is right for us to develop
the trce into a coffee table or into mulch. When called
upon for a foundation for the claim that the right way
for a tree to devclop is to "flourish" (i.e., to have lots of
leaves and seeds at certain times, reach a maximal
height or width, whatever) Taylor gives us the
fol1owing claim: "We can think of the good of an
individual nonhuman organism as consisting in the
full development of its biological powers.''6 But the
"biological power" of any tree is for it, ultimately, to
become mulch or ashes. Moreover, if we are to avoid
the "arrogance" of thinking of ourselves as being outside
of nature, ilien the fact that many trees wind up as coffee
t.ables means that the "biological power" of many trees
is to become coffee tables.
Things are not improved one bit by going deeper
into the history of philosophy to find a foundation for
an environmental ethic. Robin Attfield, for example,
eventually fesses up to an underlying "Aristotelian
principle" beneath the attribution of interests to non
sentient beings. Pol1owing Clark,7 Attfield pegs tlle neo
Aristotelian telos of a thing a<; "the proper fulfillment
of fits 1 genetically programmed potentialities."g What
is "neo" about this nco-Aristotelianism is not just the
mention of genetic programming but, more importantly,
the fact that tele are attributed to nonsentients on the
basis of ilieir own ends whereas Aristotle held that the
good of plants had to be understood in terms of the
good of animals which, in tum, had to be understood in
terms of the good of humans. By reducing all
teleological concerns to humans, Aristotle avoids the
obvioLlS problem wiili Attfield's position, namely, that,
in chcx1sing among ilie ends that befall trees, we are

that we ought to adopt some biotic perspective
inasmuch as the biosphere docs not appear to be the
kind of thing that can have a perspective.
What was not recognized by Regan was that these
two lines of criticism are antithetical. If the biosphere
cannot have a good of its own, then nothing could be
sacrificed for that good. For the sake of clarity, animal
liberationists must make up their minds about how they
ought to face off against the ecocentrists. It is the point
of this paper to argue that they (and everyone else) ought
to reject the idea that nature as a whole has any interests
or good unto itself. Tshall survey many of the arguments
that have been used to establish ecocentric positions
and argue that they all lead to an ecology which is
Llnfathomahly deep.
As a first approach to the issue of what can and
cannot have interests, let us consider the arguments of
R. G. Frey and Paul Taylor. Neither of these writers is a
full-blown hoJist (although Taylor is close). ror both,
the immediate concern is the attribution of intrinsic
value to individual nonsentients (although Frey is
interested in such an attribution only for the sake of
showing that it doesn't amount to much). Nevertheless,
it would seem as though the question about nonconative
individuals will stand or fall with the one about
nonconative wholes. Whether we are talking about
individual trees, whole forests or whole planets, the
basic mystery is how anything can have a good of its
own without being the subject of some kind of desire
or end in view.
Frey's argument is that, although nonconative things
may not be able to have an interest in anything, there
may still be things which arc in their interests. Although
trees and tractors may not have an interest in.
respectively, maximal growth or proper maintenancc,
these things may really be in thc interests of trees and
tractors. 4 Similarly, Taylor argues that, "we can act in a
being's interest or contrary to its interest without its
being interested in what we are doing to it in the sense
of wanting or not wanting us to do it."s This line of
argument is profoundly unsatisfactory. Who are we to
say what the interest of a tree is? In the case of the
lrclctor, we wiJI generally assume that it is supposed to
perform certain functions for which it was expressly
designed. And even here there are problems, for I might
buy a tractor for tIle usual reasons or I might buy one
specifically to let it rust and sit in my yard as a sculptural
statement about something. If I wanted it as sculpture
!lIen Twould not be surprised if someone suggested iliat
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to claims about what's good for it, as though they, like
the Christians, know why nature is here. Moreover, there
is another level to my uneasiness about tlleir general
line of argument caused by the constant intrusion of
neo-Aristotelianism and, more pertinently, neo
Thomism into their writings. As Passmore points out,
the Judeo-Christian tradition does not unequivocally
lead to the position that the earth is here to do with as
we please. The earth is here as a consequence of God's
benevolent and omniscient design and creation. If, then,
nature is of God's design, we should not seek to alter
the natural course of things. This, of course, is not fully
(if at all) compatible with much of Genesis, but it does
allow the Judea-Christian to hold the general ideology
that we should think of ourselves as stewards of the
eartll rather than as despots over it.
What is especially troublesome with this idea that
to alter the natural course of ulings (where "natural"
usually is taken to mean "wiUlOut human intervention")
is sacrilegious is, of course, that it is behind a pemicious
traditionalism which ha<; held, among other things, that
slavery is right because hlacks are "naturally" suited to
heavy lahor, that ahortion is wrong hecallse it interrupts
the "natural" course of the pregnancy, that euthanasia
is wrong because it alters the "natural" time of death,
iliat homosexuality is wrong because it is "unnatural"
in the sense that it constitutes "the use of an organ for
something other ilian it's intended purpose," and that
airplanes are the work of the devil because humans don't
"naturally" have wings. The deep ecologists have
dispensed with the intent of God to figure out what the
"natural course" of things is only to submit their own
assurances that they know what it is.
Nothing in this debate is advanced by Callicott's
talk of "bio-empathy," which he derives from what he
argues to be a Humean moral subjectivism. He argues
Ulat the crucial insight ofHwne is that allmistic impulses
form as hasic a part of Ollf overall set of moral
sentiments as do egoistic ones. These altruistic impulses,
however, are extremely variable, given the influence
of reasonable deduction, acculturation and increased
scientific understanding. So, on iliis view, why can't
our altruistic sentiments be extended to natural objects
and even to whole ecosystcms? The rcason we can't do
this is because altruistic empathy for another is
impossible unless you know what that other entity feels,
wants or has an interest in. I can certainly undersl<wd
how I and other mammals have an interest in the
environment not becoming inhospitable to mammalian

being profoundly presumptuous in claiming to know
that the "proper" end of a tree is to have a maximal height
or width rather than to be mulch, ashes or a coffee table;
nature dictates no one of these ends over the others.
Things only get worse when we abandon the
individualistic approaches of Frey, Attfield and Taylor9
and move toward the holism of Callicott, Leopold,
Rodman, Stone and others. Here, the problem of
arrogant presumption is simply moved to a different
level. Rather than claiming that they know what is good
for a tree, they go on to claim knowledge of what is
good for the whole of the planet-cven absent any
indications from the planet itself. The move from
individualism to holism, of course, does nothing but
compound the arrogance of those who claim to know
what's good for individual trees, carrots or rocks. To
make a long argument very short, I submit that if we
humans were to explode fifty thousand nuclear devices
on the face of this planet tomorrow, there would be no
tolerably clear sense in which we have "hurt nature"
(beyond that hurt felt by sentients on this planet).
Eventually, some organisms would survive and even
thrive in the new order of things, and others would
perish-such is life. Indeed, biological diversity would
not likely be as great, because the most likely victims
of the radiation would be mammals, birds and other
predators who playa central role in diversification of
species. Indeed, the "beauty of the biotic community"
may suffer, but that will be because there will not likely
be any creatures around who have any sense of beauty. 10
The use of the word "arrogance" in the last few
paragraphs will not be seen as gratuitous by anyone
who has looked at the literature on environmental ethics.
Generally, what deep ecologists have seen as the
principle cause of our current environmental problems
is an arrogance about our relationship to nature that
comes out of not only the Judea-Christian tradition but
also the Greco-Roman tradition and the European
Enlightenment. l1 The way to combat such arrogance,
it seems to me, is to realize our profound ignorance
about how nature works and, accordingly, to adopt an
extreme conservatism in our dealings with a biological
leviathan that has the capability of retaliating with a
vengeance when we make apparently minor but
irreparable alterations in the biosphere. The course of
the deep ecologists seems, paradoxically enough, to
base environmental concern on an assumption that we
not only know Iww nature works but, also, how it oUj?ht
to work. They explicitly go beyond what's good for us
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10 That the beauty of nature is something that appears to
presuppose a human aesthetic sense is recognized by lohn
Rodman as a problem with Aldo Leopold's dictum that right
is a matter of the preservation of the" integrity. stability and
beauty of the biotic community." Rodman thinks that the tenn
"beauty" ought to be replaced by something like "diversity."
See Leopold's Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1949) and Rodman's "Ecological
Sensibility" (In VanDeVeer and Pierce, People, Penguins and
Plastic Trees. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1986).

life but I can't see at all that tlte environment has any
stake in this matter~it will go on regardless of our fate.
Moreover, nothing is advanced by the tum toward
very deep ecology reflected in the writings of people
like Rolston, the Roulleys and Shepard. This tum is
given a sympathetic rendition by Callicott, who cites
Alan Watts's claim that "the world is your body,"
Shepard's claim that "the skin is ecologically like a pond
surface or a forest soil, not a shell so much as delicate
interpenetration," Rolston's claim that "neither lake nor
self has independent being... .Inlet waters have crossed
this interface and are now embodied within me," and
Capra's claim that "quantum theory ...reveals a basic
oneness in the universe .... The Cartesian partition
between the I and the world...cannot be made.... "12
Use might well be made in these musings of ParfH's
work on personal identity. At any rate, the basic problem
remains the same: I might well feel one with the world,
but what does this part of me want? What would be
goodfor it? To tell me that I am it is to simply leave me
confused about what I feel about myself and, thus, to
leave me confused about why I should care abollt
anything. 13 This sort of ecology is not merely deep; it
is unfathomahle.

11 The historian Lynn White once argued that the
responsibility for OIlI current environmental insensitivity grew
entirely out of Christian attitudes. As John Passmore has
pointed out, onr condescension to nature has its roots in the
pre-Christian attitudes of the Greeks and Romans, and,
moreover. ludea-Christian thonght has not been completely
antithetical to an attitude of respect for natllIe. See Passmore's
Man Responsibilityfor Nature (London: Duckworth. 1980),
Part One.

s

12 See Callicott's In Defense of the Land Ethic pp. 112,
113 and 171.
13 There is another problem with this very deep ecology
(or. at least, with Callicott's sympathy for the position)
inasmuch as his "biD-empathy" is based on an extension of onr
natural altruism, not a mere extension of our egoism as would
result from a serious belief that the world really is my body.
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